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A call to resist illegitimate authority

March 1984

Free Elections in El Salvador
FRANK BRODHEAD

On

March 25, 1984, more than a
million Salvadorans will go to the polls.
They will be casting their ballots in El
Salvador's presidential election.
Although the election will be interpreted as a vote for peace, it will be
used by the Reagan administration to
justify the continued U.S. military
buildup in Central America. The Salvadoran election is not an exercise in
democracy, but its opposite: a means
to deny Salvadoran self-determination
and to justify U.S. intervention.
For most Salvadorans the election
ritual is meaningless and participation
is compulsory. Voting is a means of
keeping alive for another day. The
election will affect Salvadorans chiefly
by its impact on U.S. policy. It is for
us, the citizens of the United States,
that this election drama is conceived,
written, staged, and interpreted. It is
for us that the fine words of ''democracy" aod "self-determination" are
scripted. It is for us-not the Salvadorans-that this election is called "free."
Our role in this election is not simply
passive. As in much experimental theater, we as audience also have a role to
play in the drama. If we find the election drama sufficiently·convincing, our
role may be expanded to support the
dispatch of U.S. troops to Central
America. Instead of a bit part, we may
be offered the same leading role we had
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in Vietnam. But if. we denounce the
drama as a fraud, as not genuine, as
insulting and laughable, the Reagan
administration may be blocked from
escalating U.S. military aid to its Salvadoran clients at a militarily critical
stage in the war.
Demonstration Elections
The Salvadoran election of March
1984 may be best described as a
"demonstration election." That is, it is
an election whose secondary purpose is
to select political leaders or even to ratify the political leaders chosen by the
Reagan administration. The purpose
of the demonstration election, rather,

is to convince the citizens of the United
States that their client government is
freely chosen. While many colonial
powers (including the Soviet Union)
have sponsored fraudulent elections in
client states, the demonstration election has become particularly important
for U.S. intervention strategy. It is one
of the major vehicles through which
the United States legitimizes the expen-·
diture of billions of dollars and thousands of lives in the slaughter of more
thousands of lives in the defense of
Continued on Page Three

Defeating Reagan
As this issue of the Resist newsletter
goes to the typesetter, the U.S. Battleship New Jersey, off the coast of
Lebanon, is engaged in the heaviest
and most sustained military action
since the Vietnam War. An undetermined number of Lebanese civilians
have been killed or maimed by the U.S.
barrage. Jesse Jackson has correctly
stated: " ... countless numbers of
civilians are being murdered by this
latest assault. It's happening with a
kind of blind, racist arrogance that is a
reminder of Vietnam." In a fit of frustrated, revengeful rage, Ronald Reagan has exposed the bankruptcy of his
militaristic foreign policy, caused unnecessary death and suffering and significantly increased the potential for a
major military confrontation in the
Middle East. Meanwhile, with the possibility of U.S. ground forces landing
in El Salvador either before, during or
after the Salvadoran elections in late
March, it becomes very clear that we
must prevent Reagan from winning his
re-election bid. The thought of Reagan
spending four more years in the White
House without the constraint of having
to think about his re-election is nightmarish, but real.
With presidential elections eight
months away, it is crucial for the left to
deal with this hotly debated issue and
act immediately. Although every group
on the left seems to have some kind of
anti-Reagan strategy, National
CISPES (the Committee in Solidarity
with the People of El Salvador), at its
first national convention, adopted a
reasonable strategy that should be
looked at. After intense debate,
CISPES decided to support the rainbow coalition forming around Jesse
Jackson and to contribute to the defeat
of Reagan and his allies through focusing on their Central American and
Caribbean policy.
Although the CISPES resolution
stopped short of endorsing Jackson as
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CISPES, in passing its resolutions,
recognized that Reagan is extremely
vulnerable on the issue of Central
America. We must recognize that Reagan is also very vulnerable on the issues
of arms control and the Middle East.
There is a growing sentiment that Reagan's policies in these areas have failed
miserably but unless this message is
heard from the grassroots level, it will
be ignored.
The left will never come to a consensus on how to defeat Reagan, but one
thing is clear: he must go. The next several months provide an excellent
opportunity to raise the important
issues and put them on a national agenda. By doing this through demonstrations, forums, and door-to-door canvassing in our communities, we can significantly contribute to Reagan's
defeat. The time to act is now.

a candidate, the convention recognized
the importance of a national rainbow
coalition that is bringing together the
poor, the elderly, the pisabled, people
of color, gays and lesbians, women and
progressives. As the Mel King campaign did at a city-wide level in Boston,
Jackson's rainbow coalition represents
the potential for a unique and powerful
national coalition that can have a serious impact in the political direction of
this country. Jackson's candidacy is
providing opportunities that should
not be lost or ignored.
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Free Elections in El Salvador
Continued from Page One
U.S. "interests."
It is significant that such an exercise,
a demonstration election, has become
necessary in managing U.S. interests in
the Third World. For it was not always
so. The United States intervened in
Central America prior to the Second
World War with no thought given to
"electing" a Somoza in Nicaragua or a
Ubico in Guatemala. The United States
required no such justification when it
appointed Diem the president of the
imaginary country of "South
Vietnam.'' Indeed, the United States
has frequently exercised its influence in
Third World countries to prevent a free
election, as it did in Vietnam in 1956
and in El Salvador in 1961 and 1972.
The U.S. support for free elections is
selective, tending to support free elections which ratify a candidate of our
choice while opposing free elections in
which the outcome is problematic.
The rise of the demonstration election is distinctly a product of the growing anti-imperialist revolt in the postWorld War II period. More specifically, the United States gave little
thought to using elections to legitimize
its counterrrevolutionary work in the
Philippines or Greece in the 1940s, in
Iran in 1953, or in Guatemala in 1954.
But the prolonged U.S. involvement in
Indochina undermined automatic
domestic support for the imperial
enterprise. By 1966 the Johnson
administration found it expedient to
ratify its rescue of antidemocratic
forces in the Dominican Republic by
staging an election; and in the following year it staged another election to
consolidate Thieu and Ky as the leaders
of Vietnam, thereby legitimizing further U.S. intervention as a response to
the request of a "freely elected government.'' In both elections the Johnson
administration was at pains to present
the election-day events and the
mechanics of the election as on the
democratic up-and-up. Election
observers were provided to supervise
the fairness of the balloting.
The elections in the Dominican
Republic and South Vietnam set the
pattern for future demonstration elections. In both these and later elections
a critical role in their legitimizing and
demonstration function was played by
the mass media. Because the purpose
of the election is to influence U.S. citizens, the election managers in the State
Department, Pentagon, and CIA must
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rely on the privately owned U.S. mass
media to shape the appropriate audience response to the election drama.
There is clearly room for error here, as
contradictory facts can (and often do)
slip through. Yet on the whole the
media fulfill their role by consistently
accepting the premises of election
drama, putting certain questions on the
agenda and keeping others off the
agenda. For example, the media can be
counted on to play along with the
''Will the guerrillas disrupt the election?" theme, and to accept the equation of a high voter turnout with political enthusiasm for the choices offered
in the election. Most of the important
questions, however, are kept off the
agenda, or at least off the front pages.
For example, completely lost in the
media's fixation with political personalities and "Who will win?" are questions like:
1. Is there genuine freedom of
speech? Could a candidate campaign
for real land reform and the withdrawal of U.S. forces without being
assassinated by government security
forces or "death squads"?
2. Is there a free press? Could it support a candidate who was for real land
reform and a withdrawal of U.S.
forces? Would its reporters "disappear," would its editors be arrested,
would its presses be bombed?
3. Can popular organizations grow
and survive if they are independent
and/ or critical of the government? Are
there trade unions, peasant associations, professional and artistic groupings? Are their officers assassinated or
their militants routinely tortured by
state officials? Ironically, this test-the
existence of voluntary or "intermediate'' organizations of citizens standing
between state power and an atomized
populace-is one stressed by liberal
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democratic theorists in criticizing the
lack of democracy in totalitarian
states. Yet the free press in the United
States seldom raises these questions
when considering the .context of a
U .S.-sponsored election in a Third
World country.
4. Is there a limit on what kind of
political parties can contest the election? Can candidates campaign safely?
Can a party be established without
turning over thousands of names to the
secret police? Will the party that gets
the most votes actually hold office?
Will all the major political forces in the
country be allowed to be represented
on the ballot?
5. And, is the level of state-sponsored terror sufficiently low that people acting in a political manner might
reasonably hope to survive? How
much of a climate of fear is compatible
with making a free choice in the voting
booth? Can a free choice be made in an
atmosphere dominated by the army
and associated death squads?
These and other questions affecting
the fundamental qualities of political
life are never on the agenda when the
U.S. media are discussing a U.S.sponsored election in "our" sphere of
influence.
A simple litmus test of media bias is
to imagine a similar election within the
Soviet sphere. In such cases the U.S.
media has shown an astonishing ability
to cut through rhetoric about ''democracy'' and to perceive the real meaning
of an election ritual. In the Polish election of 1947, for example, the U.S.
media accurately criticized the election
as a farce. They ridiculed the idea that
a high turnout meant political enthusiasm for the communist regime, and
correctly analyzed it as an indication of
coercion and fraud. They reported the
restrictions on the opposition party's
candidates, their difficulties in campaigning and getting on the ballot,
their exclusion from the governmentcontrolled press and radio, and the
censorship placed on opposition party
newspapers. During the Polish election
of 1947 the U.S. media did not feature
long lines of apparently happy voters
eager to do their duty, as they did during the elections in the Dominican
Republic, Vietnam, or El Salvador.
In short, it may be taken as a rule of
thumb that the U.S. media will focus
on the mechanics of the election and

Continued on Page Six
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You're in the (sexist) Army now
Does Khaki Become You?
The Militarization of Women's Lives
By Cynthia Enloe
South End Press, 1983
224 pages, $8.00 paper

KATHY GILBERD

What

are the links between the
oppression of women and militarism?
Does the military really need-or want
-women in its ranks? If we fight for
the rights of women in the military, or
for improved working conditions for
women in defense industries, are we
supporting militarism? What does it
mean for women, as women, to challenge militarist ideas? Does Khaki
Become You provides a valuable introduction to these issues.
Feminist opposition to nuclear
weapons and militarism is an increasing political force in the U.S., in Europe and elsewhere. The Seneca
Women's Peace Camp, the Women's
Pentagon Action, the Greenham Common Peace Camp, the recent attempt
of U.S. churchwomen to demonstrate
in Honduras, women's anti-nuclear
activity in Micronesia, and the mushrooming of local women's actions have
made women central to the peace
movement, and made it clear that we
need to examine the military and its use
of women.
Cynthia Enloe's book takes a
thought-provoking look at the many
ways women are affected by, and needed by, the military: as enlistees and
officers, as medical personnel, as military wives, as prostitutes, as defense
industry workers and as citizens generally affected by militarist ideology. For
instance, she traces the evolution of the
women's nursing corps from "camp
followers'' who tended the wounded in
early wars whose role was eventually
legitimized as army nurses.
At the same time, she looks at the
way the ideologies of sexism and sexrole stereotypes are used to promote
militarism and to control women's
relationship to the military. In
Pal(e Four

Women Marines circa 1970.

response to those who consider the military simply a microcosm of society,
Enloe suggests that the military
expands and reinforces society's sexism, by giving it a stamp of approval.
She begins with the understanding that
the military needs women as a gender
to promote a belief that armies must
fight to save women and families. At
the same time female participation in
military efforts is distinct from "combat" in which "real men" may participate. This separation is done by categorizing military work required of
women as "support" work, women's
work.
To allow women into the essential
core of the military, however, would
throw into confusion "all men's certainty about their male identity and
about their claim to privilege in the
Resist Newsletter

photo by Chuck Rogers

social order.'' This is the basis of the
current effort to force enlisted women
back into traditionally female occupations, and to reinforce their official
exclusion from combat.
Through interviews, vignettes and a
marvelous compilation of statistical
information, Khaki shows us the lives
of military-related women and the
mechanisms used to control them. It
demonstrates how definitions and
boundaries of "support work"
change, often swiftly and dramatically,
as the military's needs change.
Especially instructive is the section
on women in current military industries. Noting that "the present postwar era is a militarized peacetime,''
Enloe traces the re-militarization of
women through their exploitation in
electronics and related industries. In
March 1984

interviews with women in the U.S.,
England and the Philippines, she
reveals the oppressive condition under
which they work, the means by which
they are separated from understanding
and control over the products they create, and the consequences when these
women come together to talk about
and act on their exploitation.
Official efforts to control women's
lives and interactions within the military provide insights into the very conscious manipulation of our oppression.
Enloe lakes a look, for example, at the
significance of anti-lesbian witchhunts
in the military, in which women,
recruited with promises of training and
work in traditionally male fields are
punished and banished for not being
heterosexually "feminine" enough.
Even more sobering are the periodic
changes in governmental restrictions
on prostitution in military base areas,
and the racist conceptions which consider the women of third world countries "recreational outlets" for male
troops.
Women do rebel, though. Enloe provides examples of these rebellions,
including interviews with Navy women

subjected to anti-lesbian prosecutions
and others conducted with activists in
defense plants. She gives insufficient
attention,, however, to the history of
women who organized within the military during and after the Indochina
war-the women who wrote and distributed underground newspapers,
organized G.I. coffeehouses, took part
in anti-war demonstrations, and helped
to make the public aware of dissent
within the ranks. Likewise, the smaller
but significant movement among military wives during that period is not discussed in any detail.
Khaki also includes a short chapter
on women involved in wars of national
liberation, and there are important
interviews with such women. While
pointing out real gains, Enloe also
notes the tendency to give women
secondary military positions during
revolutionary periods, and then to demobilize them in the post-revolutionary period. She suggests the situation
will continue ''unless women are politically self-conscious and organizationally vocal as women about what
they want to gain from their participation in the revolution's military

effort. ... "
Throughout, Enloe gives important
insights into the relation between militarism and the oppression of women.
At the same time she poses questions
about the best way to respond to the
contradictions we uncover, and about
the advantages and problems inherent
in support for women's struggles
against the military. Khaki points out
that "scrutinizing the ideological difficulties armed forces have in coping
with women can reveal contradictions,
gaps and cracks ... into which a politics
of resistance can intervene.'' And
while some of the contradictions-the
relations between sexual oppression
and class oppression in militarist institutions, for example-remain to be discussed more thoroughly elsewhere,
Khaki prepares us to carry the discussion further.
Kathy Gilberd works with the Military Law Task Force of the National
Lawyers Guild in San Diego. This
review originally appeared in the
Guardian, an independent, radical
news weekly. The Guardian is located
at 33 West 17th St., NY, NY 10011,
212/691-0404.

IThe most
The Resist Pledge System
important source of Resist's
income is monthly pledges. Pledges
help us plan ahead by guaranteeing us
a minimum monthly income. In turn,
pledges receive a monthly reminder letter (in addition to the newsletter) which
contains news of recent grants and
other Resist activities. So take the
plunge and become a Resist pledge!
Yes, I would like to pledge $
monthly to the work of Resist.
Name _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
City _ _ _ State __ Zip _ _ __

A member of the Gray
Panthers protests at
the Pentagon (April,

1980).
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Free Elections in El Salvador
Continued from Page Three
election day events when assessing a
U .S.-sponsored election, while shifting
its focus to the more fundamental (and
allegedly undemocratic) parameters of
political power when the election is in
an enemy sphere of influence. Thus the
New York Times passed on, without
comment, Secretary of State George
Shultz's criticism of Nicaragua's forthcoming election: "An election just as
an election doesn't really mean anything," he said. "The important thing
is that if there is to be an electoral process, it be observed not only at the
moment when people vote, but in all
the preliminary aspects that make an
election really mean something.'' (Feb.
6, 1984) The U.S. media has placed off
the agenda the "preliminary aspects"
of U .S.-sponsored elections, i.e. precisely those qualities "that make an
election really mean something."
El Salvador
The election held in El Salvador in
March 1982 was a classic demonstration election. The political climate in
the United States was sceptical and
increasingly critical of our Central
American policy. Despite one of the
most conservative Congresses in many
years, public opinion in the United
States had forced somewhat cumbersome restrictions on the amount of
U.S. aid sent to El Salvador. The
March demonstration election was
instrumental in stemming this tide of
scepticism and criticism. It gave the
Reagan administration some badly
needed breathing room, letting it
regroup its right wing, fire conciliators
like Undersecretary of State Thomas
Enders and Ambassador to El Salvador Deane Hinton, and increase the
U.S. military presence in Central
America without taking a beating from
the Democrats and doubting Republicans in Congress. In thinking about the
March 1984 Salvadoran election, therefore, it is useful to analyze how the last
election achieved its demonstration
purposes.
By March 1982 two years of state
terror had cleared the ground for a free
election in El Salvador. The country
had been under a legal state of siege
since March 1980. Freedoms of movement, residence, thought, and assembly had been suspended. All Salvadoran newspapers that were critical of the
government had been closed. Among
the 30,000 civilian victims of the securPage Six

ity forces and death squads were priests
and church officials, human rights
workers and labor leaders, at least
twenty leaders of the Christian Democratic Party, and more than 1,000 students. The media did not dwell on
these longer term factors in the election. Instead they stressed the long
lines of enthusiastic voters defying
threats of guerrilla disruption to cast
their vote. They did not reflect too
much on the fact that the long lines
were produced by allocating only a few
polling places for each city (e.g. 13 in
San Salvador), by making voting legally obligatory, and by identifying those
who voted by marking their identity
cards. Neither the media nor the official U.S. observer team criticized the
use of transparent plastic ballot boxes
and transparent paper ballots.
Although Salvadoran election officials
and the U.S. Embassy predicted
between 500,000 and 800,000 Salvadorans would vote, a turnout of more
than 1,500,000 did not arouse scepticism. Two studies done by the Central
American University in El Salvador
claiming that it was physically impossible for so many people to vote within
the allotted time were quickly buried
by the U.S. media. Nor did they spend
much time puzzling over how a "massive vote for peace" could have
resulted in the victory of those forces
most determined to pursue the war
against the guerrillas.
The cooperation of the U.S. media
enabled the Reagan administration to
pull off the demonstration election and
to· temporarily halt the rapid loss of
popular confidence in its Central
Resist Newsletter

American policy. The promise of elections during the March 1982 certification hearings in Congress, and the
results of the elections during similar
hearings in July, allowed the Reagan
administration to claim that it was supporting self-determination in El Salvador. At a minimum, the election undercut those liberal Democrats who
claimed that the guerrillas had broad
support and should therefore be
included in negotiations. The election
helped retain the support of Christian
Democratic parties in Europe and
Latin America for the alleged U.S.
efforts to restore the mythical
"center" in Salvadoran politics. It
kept the congressional military aid
pipeline open a little wider and a little
longer. And, perhaps most important~
it facilitated the Reagan administration's contrived "search for peace,"
whereby the scope of possible negotiations between the political forces in El
Continued on next page
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Salvador was reduced to including the
guerrillas within the next round of the
electoral process. As the media and the
U.S. Congress had largely accepted the
legitimacy of this electoral process, the
guerrillas were placed in the position of
losing credibility if they refused to play
the electoral game, or being defeated in
an election drama controlled by the
security forces and the Pentagon if
they chose to participate.
March 1984

Like its predecessor the March 1984
Salvadoran election is a demonstration
election. It is intended to pacify the
home audience and to provide a suitable climate in which Congress can
consider the recommendations of the
Kissinger Commission for increased
military aid. Whatever the additional
consequences of the election for Salvadorans, its main effects will be in the
United States. U.S. officials have been
working on this election for a year or
more. Special Envoy Richard Stone's
first assignment was to (unsuccessfully)
attempt to move the elections up to last
fall. Members of the State Department
and the last official U.S. observer team
have been in Salvador making arrangements for the election. The United
Sta'tes has put up $6 to $8 million for
the election computers alone. The

depth of the U.S. role in the election is
indicated by a New York Times report
last May:
The Central Intelligence Agency
plans to support the election by intensifying its collection of intelligence
information about the guerrillas'
military plans and operations so as to
help the Salvadoran miltary block
anticipated efforts to disrupt the voting. . . . Because the State Department and the Salvoran Government

DEMONSTRATION ELECTIONS
U.S.·STACED ELECTIONS IN
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC,
VIETNAM, AND EL SALVADOR
Frank Brodhead and Edward S. Herman

How snould we interpret apparent voter approval of USbacked regimes in the Third World? Should we assume that
the right-wing victors have genuine popular support? Frank
Brodhead and Edward Herman examine the nature and legitimacy of these US-sponsored elections, employing a six-point
standard as a way of measuring exactly how democratic the
election processes actually were. They find that none of these
conditions were met in any of the cases under investigation,
and conclude that these so-called "free" and "fair" elections
are gigantic public relations campaigns used to demonstrate to
the US public that the governments we support are also supported by their own people.
Available March
$8.00 paperback
SOUTH END PRESS 302 Columbus Ave Boston MA 02116
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lack expertise in conducting elections
.. . a lot of the work will be turned
over the private contractors. . . . A
concern in El Salvador or the United
States would likely handle an extensive print and television advertising
campaign to promote the major voter
registration drive that the Salvadoran
Government hopes to conduct.

These efforts are being made for our
benefit and not in the interests of Salvadoran democracy. They should be
seen for what they are: the props,
script, and stage lighting of a shoddy
farce.

Frank Brodhead is a member of the
Resist board. He, along with Edward
Herman, is co-author of a recently
released book entitled: Demonstration
Elections, published by South End
Press in Boston.

JOBS

Two job openings with the Syracuse
Peace Council, a peace and social justice organization committed to social
change through educating, agitating,
organizing and nonviolence.
Projects range from local to international in scope. We envision a world
where war, violence and exploitation
of all kinds no longer exists.
Hard, worthwhile work. Long
hours. $85/week. Application deadline
May 1, 1984. Jobs open July 1 and
August 1. Contact SPC, 924 Burnet
Ave., Syracuse, NY 13203 (315)
472-5478.
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National Coalition Against Registration and the Draft (CARD), 201 Mas-

sachusetts Ave., NE, Washington,
DC 20002.
Last summer, after an evaluation
of their resources, National CARD
realized that there was a pressing
need for them to shore up their
dwindling membership/fundraising
list. Though CARD has been continually active on issues of registration
and militarism over the years, their
resources were not extensive enough
to support the ambitious outreach
and educational campaigns that they
wanted to implement. Knowing
Resist 's history of involvement in
anti-draft organizing and funding,
CARD turned to us for financial support and advice. We consulted with
them on a membership/fundraising
campaign and offered them the use of
Resist's mailing list along with a $500
loan to pay for printing and postage.
The mailing was a great success.
CARD made enough money to plan
additional mailings for the fall and to
pay back the loan with an extra $40
as a gift to Resist's loan fund.
Since last summer, CARD has done
substantial outreach and organizing
on the Solomon Amendments and the
effects of the draft, military service
and militarism on women. They have
also made a commitment to increase
their work on the third-world and
poverty drafts and to hire a thirdworld staff person. Since our initial
loan of $500 we have seen CARD
through additional mailings and given
them two small emergency grants.
One grant was used to put out the
September issue of the CARD newsletter, and with the other they purchased a used typewriter with which
to facilitate their grant-writing process. They now have a grant proposal
pending with the MS. Foundation to
fund a ½-time staffperson for the
Women's Caucus and a film/speaking
tour of Soldier Girls and women vets.
The Southern Organizing Committee

(SOC), PO Box 11308, Louisville, KY
40211.
SOC is developing a new and
potentially successful strategy for
uniting the peace movement with
grassroots community groups. This
new strategy finds its roots in SOC's
Southeast Project on Human Needs &
Justice which has been concentrating
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on leadership development and organizing among tenants in the South.
They strongly feel that the resurgent
tenant movement in the Deep South
is now developing into the leadership
force of what can become a "new
peace movement'' -one that is
grounded in the grass roots of many
local communities, with much of its
impetus and leadership coming from
Third World and poor people. In
early January, SOC held a conference
in Birmingham called "Action Strategies to Defeat Racism, Militarism
and Economic Injustice'' which was
attended predominantly by Black activists and women from tenant groups
on the Gulf Coast and in Louisiana,
Alabama and Tennessee. The purpose
of this conference was to bring
together. these activists with peace
activists from the same communities
in order to begin building coalitions.
The "new peace movement" won't
happen, organizers at SOC believe,
by grafting a constituency of Black
and poor people onto existing peace
organizations. Rather, the impetus
has to come from the opposite direction. Workshops at the conference
included discussion of racism, militarism, unemployment, housing, community organizing techniques, and
voter education. Workshop leaders
represented groups such as the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, United League of Holmes
County, War Resisters League, Black
American Network for Disarmament,
Peace and Justice, and a number of
southern tenant organizations. One
hundred and thirty-four people turned
out for the conference, 30% more
than SOC had anticipated. And much
of the leadership in the workshops
was taken by the tenant-rights activists who attended. Resist's grant
helped cover some of the costs of
housing for the conference.

malan refugee in Washington State
who is facing deportation. The JLTF
has succeeded in preventing deportation in all of the cases they have represented. This record is astounding
considering the INS crackdown on
refugees in this country. Consequently the model that the JL TF has develop~d for assisting refugees is being
adopted by groups in cities around
the country: Washington DC, Boston
and Tucson, for example.
The JLTF pairs members of the
Washington Bar with paralegals · who
serve as the resource people for the
project. Each attorney who volunteers
to work on a case is given a packet
which includes material on immigration law, precedent-setting cases .and
specifics for their community and the
state of Washington. Using the
packet as a resource and the paralegals as the foundation for the project, many attorneys volunteer their
time, including those who aren't
familiar with immigration law. Since
the work involved is not time-intensive for lawyers, the JLTF has been
very successful in recruiting volunteer
legal help.
The biggest problem the JL TF has
had to date is fundraising. Most liberal foundations feel that the project is
"beyond their scope" or do not have
enough funds available. The JL TF
came to Resist needing funds to print
a ''Know Your Right'' wallet sized
card printed in Spanish. We gave
them $500 for this project. Since that
time they have been selected as the
National Lawyers Guild summer project, which means they will receive ½
funding for a summer law student to
coordinate their work.

Joint Legal Task Force on Central
American Refugees, 1613 Smith

Tower, Seattle, WA 98104.
Because of the threat of persecution and death faced by El Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees should
they be deported, a group of attorneys in Seattle formed the Joint Legal
Task Force (JL TF) in the fall of
1982. They have set up a system that
enables them to offer free representation to every Salvadoran and Guate-
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